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The Obama Administration and Latin 
America: A Disappointing First Term?
Laurence Whitehead and Detlef Nolte
On 6 November 2012, a new president will be elected in the United States. The voters will 
decide whether President Barack Obama gets a second term or whether his contender 
Mitt Romney will succeed him in the White House. 
Analysis
The so-called Latino vote might be decisive in winning the election. While both 
candidates are courting Hispanic voters, the majority of these voters will choose Obama. 
Already in the 2008 election, Latino voters helped Obama to win key states. However, 
the strong Latino support for Obama in the previous election did not result in a special 
interest in Latin America on the part of the Obama administration. It was not until 2012 
that Obama cautiously took up the immigration/legalization issue, which is important 
to both Latin Americans and Hispanics.
  Obama started with great hope and much goodwill in Latin America. Nevertheless, 
the balance of his Latin America policy is somewhat disappointing – although one 
has to mention that Congress has finally ratified the free trade agreements with 
Colombia and Panama. 
  US–Latin America relations are routinely managed by multiple bureaucratic agen-
cies, which can act quite autonomously and are often not coordinated via a common 
strategy. Obama’s Latin America policy has frequently been hampered by political 
polarization and partisan divisions in Congress. 
  The intermestic dimension of US–Latin American relations has complicated foreign 
policy, because a more self-confident and autonomous majority in Latin America 
has sometimes sought a policy shift with regard to highly sensitive topics, such as 
drugs, immigration and Cuba.
  One issue area where some would criticize the Obama administration is its slowness 
in improving relations with Brazil or placing Brazil on par with, for example, India.
  It is unlikely that Latin America’s modest ranking in US foreign policy will increase 
or that Washington’s priorities will shift much after the November 2012 elections. 
Keywords: USA, Latin America, Obama administration, intermestics
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Great Hopes after Bush
After eight years of US foreign policy under Pres-
ident George W. Bush, which was dominated by 
“war on terror” rhetoric, “coalition of the willing” 
militarism and unilateralism, and relative disinter-
est in most of the policy reforms and social inno-
vations developing south of the Rio Grande, Lat-
in American opinion makers greeted the election 
of Barack Obama in November 2008 with good-
will and some genuine anticipation. Obama’s rep-
utation for intelligence and sensitivity to interna-
tional concerns, his skepticism about the Iraq in-
vasion, his life experience as a community orga-
nizer in poor Afro-American parts of Chicago, 
his legal expertise, and the hope he was able to 
inspire, particularly among the college-educated 
young as well as the inner-city ethnic electorate 
(including most so-called “Hispanic” voters), all 
seemed to indicate that this change of presidency 
might also signal a substantial change in Washing-
ton’s approach to its Western Hemisphere neigh-
bors. Even hardcore anti-American figures like Fi-
del Castro and Hugo Chávez appeared willing 
at first to give him the benefit of the doubt. Ma-
ny US-based commentators and think tanks, in-
cluding the Brookings Institution, offered a large 
menu of suggestions on how the incoming admin-
istration might capitalize on this climate of good-
will, and where opportunities to mark a new di-
rection might be found (Lowenthal, Piccone, and 
Whitehead 2009).
Two years into Obama’s first term, research-
ers at the Brookings Institution revisited some 
of these ideas in light of the developments that 
had taken place so far (Lowenthal, Piccone, and 
Whitehead 2010). While the emphasis and inter-
pretations of the various contributors differed, 
there was a general recognition that most of these 
initial hopes had been set too high. Symptomat-
ic of this was the fact that the promise to close 
Guantanamo prison had not been honored, and 
that, after no more than the briefest of pauses, the 
“ALBA” group, led by President Chávez, had re-
sumed its negative discourse. Obviously, the 
gravity of the economic crisis facing the incoming 
president had absorbed most of his energies, and 
in the foreign policy domain continuing and se-
vere security challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
elsewhere in the Muslim world had necessari-
ly taken priority over less urgent Western Hemi-
sphere concerns. On the domestic political front 
the new president had run into ferocious opposi-
tion to his healthcare reforms, and a deeply polar-
ized internal climate had drastically reduced his 
room for maneuver on peripheral issues. 
Modest Achievements, Lost Opportunities 
While acknowledging the domestic constraints 
on the administration, many observers and ana-
lysts still hold a critical view on US–Latin Amer-
ica policy during the Obama presidency. Indeed, 
some ask whether there has been a foreign policy 
for Latin America at all. A 2011 article in the Amer-
icas Quarterly by Moisés Naim is illustrative: “U.S. 
policy toward Latin America is lethargic, unimag-
inative and surprisingly irrelevant […] The fact 
that Latin America does not figure in the calcu-
lations or conversations of top U.S. decision mak-
ers does not preclude some of them from giving 
speeches about U.S. policy towards the region that 
are as disconnected from reality as those given by 
Fidel Castro in Cuba.” One contributing factor is 
that foreign policy and Latin America policy be-
came the victims of partisan political polarization 
and ideology-driven foreign policy initiatives in 
Congress. 
A key example of this was the coup against 
President Zelaya in Honduras, when Obama sid-
ed within the Organization of American States 
(OAS) with the Latin American countries against 
the new Honduran government but some Repub-
lican senators had their own foreign policy agen-
da. The latter supported the new Honduran gov-
ernment and blocked the confirmation in the Sen-
ate of the US ambassador to Brazil and of the as-
sistant secretary of state for the Western Hemi-
sphere. In Foreign Affairs, Christopher Sabati-
ni (2012) commentated sourly, “This absurdity – 
blocking for nine months the appointment of a re-
gional assistant secretary of state and an ambassa-
dor to the region’s most important player (and the 
world’s seventh-largest economy) over a minor 
ideological spat regarding a tiny country – shows 
the lack of seriousness of the workings of the U.S. 
Congress in general. But it also shows how un-
seriously Latin America is taken in particular and 
what sorts of issues are considered important.” 
This hijacking of Latin America policy by Re-
publican senators obliged the administration to 
function with “carryover” appointments from its 
predecessor. Fortunately, the end of the previous 
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administration had seen a considerable improve-
ment in the caliber of appointments, so the transi-
tion from Bush to Obama was less disruptive than 
it might have been. However, this also meant there 
was little scope for conspicuous innovation; or, as 
Leslie H. Gelb (2012) wrote: “Even with America’s 
own difficulties and other international priorities, 
the Southern Hemisphere has commanded shock-
ingly little time from the White House. […] At the 
Cartagena summit 2012, Obama was slammed for 
his failure to roll up his sleeves on either the Cu-
ban embargo or drugs. The most interest Ameri-
cans showed in the region came when Secret Ser-
vice officers were found to be cavorting with pros-
titutes.” 
The new focus of US policy toward the region 
was on promoting economic and social opportuni-
ty, ensuring citizen security, strengthening effec-
tive democratic institutions, and securing a clean-
energy future. Naim (2011) has criticized this 
agenda as being better suited to an economic de-
velopment agency and not the State Department. 
It has allowed US diplomats to avoid tackling real 
and politically explosive issues. A little more po-
litical realism is necessary, because “development 
does not mean the end of politics” and because US 
policymakers need a reminder “that twenty first-
century Latin America has its own, autonomous 
power dynamics” (Sabatini 2012).
Whether through lack of presidential atten-
tion or as a reflection of Obama’s own outlook, 
the result after four years is that positive results 
appear to be lacking. Washington has been “reac-
tive” rather than “proactive” as issues have aris-
en. Problems certainly have arisen, of course: the 
drug war in Mexico escalated; Haiti’s fragile in-
stitutions were devastated by a huge natural di-
saster; the Honduran political class united to oust 
a constitutionally elected president; the Paraguay-
an president Lugo was deposed by an impeach-
ment, and the new Paraguayan government was 
suspended from UNASUR and Mercosur. Wash-
ington’s responses can be characterized as impro-
vised and lacking a sense of strategic direction. 
However, this lack of initiative may also reflect 
the US government’s relative loss of power and 
influence in Latin America. The case of Paraguay 
is symptomatic of this. After Brazil, UNASUR and 
Mercosur had taken a decision on the issue, no-
body was interested in the US position and the 
OAS position was also widely ignored.
The commodity-driven expansion and diver-
sification of Latin American trade has broadened 
the room for maneuver of most countries in the re-
gion. The possibilities for the US to use economic 
sanctions as leverage have been reduced. Regimes 
hostile to the United States can turn their backs on 
Western lending institutions such as the IMF and 
the World Bank. Thus, the negative consequences 
of actions such as defaulting on loans or national-
izing industries, or of other actions hostile to the 
interests of US companies, can be sidestepped. 
China is now a major trade partner (in some cas-
es the most important trade partner) of most Lat-
in American countries; it is also a major investor 
in Latin America and, as of quite recently, an im-
portant lender. In some cases China is also a ma-
jor supplier of military equipment. China’s loan 
commitments in 2010 were greater than the com-
bined commitments of the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and the American 
Ex-Im Bank for that year (Gallagher, Irwin, and 
Koleski 2012).
At the same time, the importance of the US as 
a trade partner of Latin America’s has diminished 
over the last decade, not least due to the rise of 
China. While in 2000 approximately 61 percent of 
Latin American exports went to the United States 
and 55 percent of Latin American imports came 
from the United States, in 2010 the corresponding 
shares were down to 41 percent and 30.5 percent. 
However, the US is still a vital trade partner for 
Latin America, and in many countries it is still the 
most important partner. Moreover, approximate-
ly 20 percent of foreign investment and 90 percent 
of remittances in Latin America come from the 
United States. Indeed, while the importance of the 
US to Latin America’s trade has diminished, the 
relative importance of Latin American imports/ex-
ports for the US has actually increased during the 
Obama years (Table 1). 
The Obama administration has mostly accept-
ed the changed geopolitical landscape in Latin 
America, albeit with more resignation than active 
endorsement. A Congressional Research Service 
study from February 2012 entitled Latin America 
and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues for Con-
gress in 2012 accepts the new reality: “U.S. policy 
toward the region must also contend with a Lat-
in America that is becoming increasingly inde-
pendent from the United States. Strong econom-
ic growth has increased Latin America’s confi-
dence in its ability to solve its own problems. The 
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region has also diversified its economic and diplo-
matic ties with countries outside the region. Over 
the past few years, several Latin American region-
al organizations have been established that do not 
include the United States.” 
At the end of President Obama’s first term, 
the sense of relative inattention and lack of inno-
vation in US policies towards the Western Hemi-
sphere has been confirmed and reinforced. Inso-
far as the record does contain initiatives of impor-
tance, domestic political considerations have typ-
ically outranked broader or more outward-look-
ing motivations. On the drugs issue, for example, 
the US gun lobby has ensured that Latin Amer-
ican governments will continue to face the fire-
power of their cartels without much effective re-
straint on arms trafficking from the major con-
sumer market. Cynthia Arnson (2011) succinctly 
argues, “Mexico demonstrates more than any oth-
er Latin American country how U.S. domestic po-
litical considerations trump foreign policy in ways 
that undermine hopes for a new direction. By Sep-
tember 2009 the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire-
arms, and Explosives had revoked the licenses of 
only 11 of the thousands of gun shops along the 
2,000-mile U.S.-Mexican border. Nor has there 
been any push by the administration or by Con-
gress to renew the 10-year ban on assault weapons 
that expired in 2004. And neither the administra-
tion nor the Senate has made ratification of the In-
ter-American Convention Against the Illicit Man-
ufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammu-
nition, Explosives and Other Related Items a pri-
ority.”
Although some minor shifts in the “embar-
go” have been introduced, in the case of Cuba the 
50-year stalemate between Miami and Havana re-
mains essentially intact. The OAS has not gained 
momentum, either in North America or with most 
of its southern membership, with the result that 
regional cooperation projects that exclude the US, 
such as CELAC and UNASUR, have tended to 
displace hemisphere-wide endeavors. In much of 
South America, trade, investment, and even geo-
political ties with extra-hemispheric partners have 
expanded as the US presence has retreated. 
Colombia is the most important contrary case, 
but even here the increased self-confidence and 
autonomy of the authorities in Bogota seems like-
ly to result in more international diversification 
rather than reinforced bilateral ties with Wash-
ington. Nonetheless, the Obama administration 
has fully endorsed the Colombian government’s 
new peace initiative. A Republican administration 
could prove more hard-line in this regard. More-
over, it was under Obama that Congress finally 
approved the free trade agreements with Colom-
bia and Panama. Obama’s administration has al-
so kept cool in the face of various provocations by 
the left-leaning presidents of Venezuela, Ecuador 
and Bolivia, while guarding against domestic ac-
cusations of softness towards America’s regional 
critics.
Explanations for the Low-Key Latin America 
Policy
While the overall assessment of the administra-
tion’s Latin America policy could obviously be 
elaborated further, the broad pattern is rather 
clear. It may thus be more useful to consider how 
this low-key outcome can be explained. Since the 
results of the 6 November 2012 US election remain 
very much in doubt at the time of writing, there 
is limited scope for predicting how US relations 
with the Americas may unfold under the next ad-
ministration. Even so, an understanding of the 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Imports from         
Latin America 17.3 17.5 17.9 17.7 17.9 17.8 18.4 19.2
– Mexico 10.6 10.2 10.7 10.7 10.3 11.3 12.0 11.9
NAFTA (Canada/Mexico) 28.0 27.4 27.0 26.8 26.3 25.8 26.5 26.3
Exports to         
Latin America 21.1 21.2 21.5 21.0 22.3 21.9 22.9 24.1
– Mexico 13.6 13.3 12.9 11.7 11.7 12.2 12.8 13.4
NAFTA (Canada/Mexico) 36.5 36.6 35.1 33.1 31.7 31.7 32.2 32.3
Source:        Authors’ own calculations based on <http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/Regions.asp>.
Table 1:  US Imports and Exports from/to Latin America as a Percentage of Total Trade
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factors that have constrained Obama’s team from 
fulfilling initial hopes in the first term should shed 
some light on future prospects as well.
Latin America has clearly ranked low in the 
administration’s policy priorities, and in all prob-
ability it will continue to do so for the next few 
years as well. Domestic and economic challeng-
es are likely to outweigh most foreign policy con-
cerns, and other parts of the world are likely to de-
mand whatever attention the administration can 
spare for international affairs (except those with a 
very direct linkage to internal policy issues or do-
mestic partisan divides). This is especially true as 
regards the focus of the White House. 
A fair assessment of President Obama’s Latin 
America record needs to recognize that the region 
is not central in US foreign policy. Candidates do 
not expect to win elections with topics related to 
Latin America, but they know they could lose elec-
tions with topics like illegal migration, drug traf-
ficking, organized crime, or weakness in the face 
of anti-American stances. So while it is correct that 
there are many so-called intermestic topics link-
ing the US with Latin America, most of these top-
ics have a negative connotation. To make things 
even more complicated, in some of these areas 
Latin American countries are now demanding a 
policy shift on the part of the US government, as 
a report from the Inter-American Dialogue from 
April 2012 states: “The US position on these trou-
blesome issues – immigration, drug policy, and 
Cuba – has set Washington against the consensus 
view of the hemisphere’s other 34 governments. 
These issues stand as obstacles to further cooper-
ation in the Americas. The United States and the 
nations of Latin America and the Caribbean need 
to resolve them in order to build more produc-
tive partnerships.” For the moment it is quite dif-
ficult to foresee major progress with regard to any 
of these topics in the near future given the appar-
ent distribution of US electoral preferences in the 
6 November contest.
Although President Obama has received much 
criticism for his Latin America policy, his popu-
larity in the hemisphere remains high. In the first 
year of his presidency the Latinobarómetro survey 
recorded a clear differentiation from the Bush ad-
ministration. Indeed, his initial evaluation was ex-
traordinarily positive (7.0 on a 1–10 scale; in com-
parison, Bush 2008: 4.5). In the second year it fell 
slightly (6.3), and remained at that level in 2011. 
The Pew global survey of the level of confidence in 
the US president also saw increased ratings after 
the end of the Bush presidency that then fell in the 
second year of Obama’s presidency. Table 2 pres-
ents the country-specific ratings.
Table 2:  Confidence in the US President, 
2008–2012, by Country
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
USA 37 74 65 61 61
Germany 14 93 90 88 87
Argentina 7 61 49 -- --
Brazil -- -- 56 63 68
Mexico 16 55 43 38 42
Note:  Full question wording: “Now I’m going to read 
a list of political leaders. For each, tell me how 
much confidence you have in each leader to do 
the right thing regarding world affairs – a lot of 
confidence, some confidence, not too much con-
fidence, or no confidence at all.” US President 
George W. Bush (2002–2008), Barack Obama 
(2009–2012). Confidence combines “a lot of con-
fidence” and “some confidence” responses. 
Source:  Pew Research Center, Pew Global Attitudes 
Project: <www.pewglobal.org>.
While in many policy areas the administration’s 
room for maneuver has been restricted by its lim-
ited power base in Congress, there is one impor-
tant area where the president could have done 
substantially better. This is the US policy with re-
gard to Brazil. Brazil expects that the US govern-
ment treat it as an equal and that the US recognize 
South America as a Brazilian zone of influence. In 
some respects relations between Lula and Bush 
were better than those between Obama and Lu-
la or Dilma. Many Brazilians consider the period 
of the Bush and Lula presidencies to be one of the 
best in bilateral relations (Castro Neves and Spek-
tor 2010). In the case of the joint Turkish–Brazil-
ian initiative to broker an agreement with Iran re-
garding that country’s nuclear ambitions, both the 
US and Brazil acted clumsily. While the US gov-
ernment publicly supports India’s quest for a per-
manent seat on the UN Security Council, it does 
not do so in the Brazilian case. Until the end of 
2011 the US levied special taxes on Brazilian etha-
nol imports. A planned deal to sell Embraer train-
ing jets to the US military failed because the bid-
ding procedure was stopped. To summarize, a 
new US policy approach towards Brazil is long 
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overdue (see Hakim 2011 and the Council on For-
eign Relations (2011) task force report, Global Bra-
zil and U.S.–Brazil Relations). Even here, however, 
close inspection indicates that US–Brazil coopera-
tion behind the scenes is often closer and more ef-
fective than it appears to be in public.
Who Decides on the United States’ Latin 
America Policy?
Latin Americans familiar with vertical and often 
highly personalized systems of presidential gov-
ernance often assume that the US political system 
shares these features. It can be difficult to accept 
that despite polite diplomatic discourse, in reali-
ty their country’s priorities and appeals do not re-
ally register within the White House. In practice, 
a lower level of bureaucratic politics determines 
the great bulk of the policy interactions between 
the USA and its neighbors. Of course, there is al-
ways an appearance of presidential coordination 
through the White House and the National Secu-
rity Council, but in practice these central agencies 
cannot monitor effectively on all fronts and tend 
to focus on no more than a limited set of urgent 
priorities. The majority of Latin American politi-
cians more or less understand the role of certain 
agencies – the Pentagon, the CIA, and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration – although they of-
ten assume that their policies are more central-
ly controlled than is generally the case. Howev-
er, there is less understanding of the huge variety 
of distinct and relatively autonomous Washington 
institutions that can impinge on foreign policy-
making, and still less understanding of how diffi-
cult coordination between them can be. 
When President Carter prepared an agenda for 
a high-level summit with Mexico’s president Lo-
pez Portillo in 1979, he appointed a special ambas-
sador, the experienced Democratic veteran Rob-
ert Strauss, to help him. This was an ambassador 
from the White House, not to Mexico but to all the 
other Washington agencies with entrenched poli-
cy interests in Mexico. The task was to work out 
what the US Department of Agriculture, the Bu-
reau of Mines, the Congressional Subcommit-
tee on Irrigation, and the state authorities in Tex-
as, among others, would ask for and were pre-
pared to offer in the course of an overall bargain-
ing session with the Mexican government. Simi-
lar coordination problems arise with other Latin 
American countries, or groups of countries, and 
if anything the partisan gridlock in contemporary 
Washington makes these difficulties even more in-
tractable now than in the past.
Given the brief space available here, it is not 
possible to map all the major institutions that have 
contributed to shaping (or blocking) policy inno-
vations towards Latin America during Obama’s 
first term. But the point can be illustrated by se-
lecting just one agency – one not normally given 
much attention by Latin American analysts – and 
listing some of its significant current activities. The 
Department of Justice under Eric Holder has, over 
the last few weeks, refused to extradite ex-presi-
dent Sanchez Losada to Bolivia to answer to the 
(unreasonable) genocide charges brought against 
him there. It has also upheld ex-president Ernesto 
Zedillo’s claim to diplomatic immunity, so that he 
cannot be brought before a US court to answer hu-
man rights charges that were filed against him by 
a group of indigenous Mexican plaintiffs. Holder 
is currently said to be “in contempt of Congress” 
because he has declined to supply it with infor-
mation it has demanded concerning Operation 
Fast and Furious, a US scheme to supply illegal 
weapons to Mexican arms dealers in order to flush 
out their networks (in this case President Obama 
signed an order of executive privilege blocking 
the department from cooperating with Congress 
on national security grounds). The Department 
of Justice can also be expected to refuse to allow 
a leader of the FARC, extradited from Colombia, 
to return to his country of origin in order to par-
ticipate in the peace negotiations being initiated 
there. It is also largely through the actions of this 
department that the number of illegal aliens de-
tained at their place of employment and then de-
ported to their country of origin has approximate-
ly doubled since Obama came to office. This list is 
perhaps sufficient to confirm that anyone trying to 
explain the content of the current administration’s 
policies towards the hemisphere needs to pay fair-
ly close and specific attention to the activities of 
this Washington agency, and yet the Department 
of Justice is just one institution among many.
Outlook: After the Elections
On 6 November 2012, the US electorate will choose 
a new president, a new House of Representatives, 
and a different balance of forces within the US Sen-
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ate. Depending on the preferences of the voters in 
these contests, the current administration’s poli-
cy stances will be reconfirmed or new and differ-
ent officeholders and platform commitments will 
be adopted. The uncertainties surrounding these 
elections seem considerable. Even so, the balance 
of probabilities is that the recent executive inat-
tention to Latin America is likely, on the whole, 
to persist, and that many issues of great interest 
to Washington’s allies in the Western Hemisphere 
are likely to be managed in a reactive and unco-
ordinated manner, and to be processed through 
bureaucratic routine, and even inertia, rather than 
becoming the object of high-level strategic reas-
sessment. This is particularly likely if Obama wins 
a second term with a narrow majority, although 
there could be some incremental adjustments de-
pending on how he performs in certain key states 
such as Florida, and with some “swing” voter 
blocks, most notably among Hispanics. 
If the Republicans either enter the White House 
or capture the Senate, there is a greater chance of 
a significant shift towards more hard-line rheto-
ric against those Latin American governments 
that have been identified as unfriendly. It is more 
doubtful that such a rhetorical switch would be 
followed through with systematic policy innova-
tions. For one thing, the continued gridlock and 
resource scarcity is likely to mean that an incom-
ing administration would have more urgent mat-
ters to deal with and would lack cohesive direc-
tion, at least for an extended transition period. For 
another, various Latin American governments can 
be expected to react against more hard-line posi-
tions by strengthening their defenses and reinforc-
ing their alternative dispositions. There is some 
potential that a Romney administration might opt 
to throw some Latin American “red meat” to its 
conservative supporters, on the basis that fewer 
risks would be involved in adopting doctrinaire 
policies in the Western Hemisphere than in other 
parts of the world where the US position is more 
vulnerable. However, this suggestion is quite hy-
pothetical and fairly speculative. A return to the 
postures of the George W. Bush administration 
at its most aggressive would be unlikely to work 
well, or to last long. On the whole, therefore, it 
is reasonable to forecast “more of the same” after 
2013 as far as Washington’s Latin America policies 
are concerned. For many observers in the hemi-
sphere this is a rather dispiriting prospect that 
could result in Latin America and the US drifting 
further apart.
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